When is a Sign not a Sign by Pryluck, Calvin
Spring 1992 221 
When is a Sign not a Sign 
Calvin Pryluck 
Prepared for presentation at Annual Conference, University Film and Video 
Assn.; Corvallis, Oregon, August 1991. Based on earlier versions: 
"Cuando un signo no es signo" (Maria Eugenia Franscho, trans.) 
Video-Forum 
"Kiedy znak nie jest znakiem" (Ireneusz Siwiniski, trans.) Kino 
(Warsaw, Poland) XVIII (August, 1984): 25-27. 
A caveat: I come to this domain of inquiry as a long-time expatriate. In 
another life I spent a number of years trying to understand the relationships 
between language, film, and cognition. Since then I have visited only 
occasionally; I claim no particular up-to-date knowledge. Yet the remarks that 
follow may be useful as a first approximation to an approach that apparently 
has not been investigated previously. 
When I started, classical linguistics was still provoking an uneasy 
fascination among film scholars. Faced with a messy, complex phenomenon 
we looked enviously at the neat arrays of categories and concepts constructed 
over the years by linguists. We forgot that our understanding of languages is 
based on hundreds-even thousands-of years of study of an equally messy and 
complex phenomenon. 
For instance, the form class categories of verb, noun, preposition, and the 
rest are not self-evident. They needed to be specified by careful analysis. 
Plato started it; on later extended examination, it turned out that form classes 
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appear to be applicable principally to Latinate languages. And the last time 
I looked, some years ago, work was still going on dealing with the problem of 
whether particular form classes were a language universal.1 
Yet, frustrated by the disorder of our own field, many early film theorists, 
at least those who wrote in English, tried to apply form class terminology to 
film with results that we now recognize as distortions of the basic 
phenomenon. I doubt that there are many film scholars who still take 
seriously John Howard Lawson's 1964 assertions that "internal montage 
resembles the intransitive verb while cutting . . . is transitive."2 Once we began 
to look seriously at a broader sample of films and at the theoretical basis for 
language, "Film Grammar" was recognized as an obviously deficient approach. 
I honestly should not be too harsh with those who examined these 
possibilities since I have not been exempt from the urge myself. In the late 
sixties some of us, including Sol Worth and Christian Metz3, had looked at the 
same evidence and had independently reached the same conclusion: film is 
clearly not a language, yet it can be studied as if it were. 
That moment in history was like a pool break; having been struck by the 
same conclusion, we went off in divergent directions. It took me several years 
to become absolutely convinced that language and film have nothing to do with 
each other as formal systems, except that they are both sign systems.4 I use 
the phrase "sign systems" for reasons of convenience, though it makes me 
uneasy. I now believe that the terminology of sign, signifier, and signified 
distorts the analysis of film as a formal system. 
Briefly stated, my argument is a simple one: As logical systems language 
is deductive and film is inductive. This distinction is important since using an 
incorrect assumption about the logic of the system could lead to erroneous 
descriptions such' as those in the film grammar canon. Further, if we are 
serious about studying film viewing as an act of cognition we must correctly 
understand the components of the stimulus. Deductive and inductive systems 
operate under different types of rules that make different cognitive demands 
on viewers. 
Language and film differ at every level of linguistic analysis: phonemic, 
morphemic, syntactic, and semantic. Since we are talking about basic 
distinctions, it is necessary to go through some basic and widely understood 
points about language. Bear with me while I review some of these matters to 
make the argument. 
We can start by examining the basic coding variables of the two sign 
systems. This is the phonemic level which deals with the smallest unit of 
speech that distinguish one utterance from another in language. The basis of 
language is vocal sound. The human voice is capable of creating thousands of 
distinguishable sounds; only forty or fifty of these sounds--phonemes--are 
typically significant in any given language. 
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This is not to say that only this many sounds are meaningfully uttered. 
Around each phoneme there is a range of acceptable and interchangeable 
sounds-technically, allophones. But at some point in the range of possible 
sounds there is a border between phonemes. These differ for different 
languages and dialects, but a border is always present. For instance, native 
speakers of English have no difficulty in producing and recognizing the 
phonemes / n / and /ng/ as in given or giving. To the speaker of Spanish, 
however, / n / and /ng/ are allophones for the same phoneme with the 
sometimes comical result that a native speaker of Spanish trying to learn 
English does not seem to know the difference between singing and sinning. 
There are numerous similar illustrations of the point; the fact is clear; 
there are phonemic boundaries between the range of sounds in language. 
These are not artificial boundaries similar to the various sets of words used in 
different languages to break up the color spectrum. Phonemic boundaries are 
part of the system and part of what makes the system work. 
The situation in film is quite different. There is nothing in film 
equivalent to the phonemic boundary in language. The basis of film consists 
of photographic images and various sounds. To simplify the argument I will 
consider only photography, but with appropriate modifications anything I say 
on this point could be said about sound in film. 
The minimum requirements for encoding a photographic image are 
lighting, angle of view, and a lens. Subsumed under these general categories 
are specific variables such as lighting angles and lighting key, size of image, 
placement of objects within the frame, lens perspective and depth of field. All 
of these more-or-less independent coding variable could be consequential in 
communicating meaning; from these coding variables there arise the potential 
for countless possibilities of depiction. 
The important point is that there is no clear boundary within the range 
of film variables. They are continuous in the mathematical sense of the word. 
A camera could be placed five degrees above eye level, or six, or ten, or any 
other angle that is physically possible. It is clear that only in gross terms are 
there boundaries between these choices. Obviously if a thing is photographed 
from the back, the picture would be different than from the front. Otherwise 
there is literally an infinite range of possibilities between any one choice of 
angle and any other. The story is the same for all the other coding variables. 
There are effectively no boundaries. 
This is only the beginning. Words and images differ in fundamental ways 
at what is described in linguistics as the morphemic level. Here we are dealing 
with the smallest unit of relatively stable meaning. One of the consequences 
of the photographic basis of film is that at the outset the image is fairly 
specific to the object. This is in contrast to language where a word is 
224 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
more-or-less general. In brief, images tend to be specific while words tend to 
be general. 
Despite these tendencies, pictures are not absolutely specific nor are 
words absolutely general. The word chair subsumes a limited number of 
criterial attributes; a chair spoken about is a generalized four-legged seat with 
a back. A picture of a chair represents a specific chair with a larger number 
of attributes. Words may range in generality from the most general to the 
most specific as in the series of words: seat, bench, chair, throne, cathedra, and 
pouf. However, no matter how specific a word is, it still refers to a set of 
criterial attributes. Furthermore, there are boundaries between words; a chair 
is one thing; a bench another. Only in the physical world-the world that 
photography draws upon--is there possible confusion around whether a 
particular object is a "chair" or a "bench." 
The specificity of a picture can be generalized by reducing the unique 
attributes of an object to general attributes of a class of objects. Obviously, 
this is accomplished through manipulation of coding variables. A silhouette 
and a full face photograph can serve as a simple illustration. 
Say there is a man, a particular man, with a number of particular 
attributes. When photographed full face, as in a passport picture, a number 
of these attributes will be made manifest; we can see the mole on his cheek 
as well as his dimples if he smiles. A silhouette of the same man will obscure 
both his mole and his dimples, but will emphasize the general shape of his 
head, his perhaps prominent nose, or most of all, the picture will emphasize 
his general characteristics as a man, or as a human Toeing. There is a full 
range of possibilities between the passport picture and the silhouette; there is 
no clear point where one becomes the other. Again, there is literally an 
infinite range of possibilities with no effective boundary. 
Words and images differ in another important characteristic at the level 
of meaning, technically, semantics. Words are sounds that have come to mean 
what they mean over a period of usage in a particular relationship to a 
concept. For any word, whether of concrete or abstract denotation and 
connotation, the essential source of meaning is in the conventional connection 
between the term and its concepts. Concepts have no embodiment other than 
the word; concepts have no concrete existence. This is clear for words such 
as love, democracy, and God but it is equally true for all words. 
No one, it has been suggested, has ever seen "pencil." They might have 
seen objects with certain characteristics, that is, instances of a class of things 
to which the word pencil can be applied within a given group of language 
users, but "pencil" is an abstraction, a concept, as is "dog," "rock," or any other 
supposedly concrete object. It does not matter whether I speak of a dog, 
chien, or hund, I am still referring to a certain kind of animal, typically a 
household pet.5 
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Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to speak, as deSaussure did, 
of signifier and signified as linked like two sides of a piece of paper. The use 
of these terms in description of a film image is one of the sources of mischief 
introduced by the use of linguistic categories in describing film. 
In contrast to words with their one basic source of meaning, the "signifier" 
in film (or any other photographic image) with few exceptions consists of two 
elements: objects or events, that can be photographed and depiction, the way 
in which coding variables have been manipulated in rendering an image of the 
objects or events. While depiction modifies the meaning of objects or events, 
the meaning of an image is undergirded by the attributes of the object or 
event. 
In an image, the meaning potential in the object is a fixed point 
establishing a range of meanings. Depiction can variously emphasize attributes 
to modify meaning within that range. No matter how depicted an image of an 
old man evokes different meanings than the image of a young woman. At the 
same time, depiction contributes to the meaning; lighting, image size, angle of 
view, and so on are part of the meaning of an image. In the relationship 
between object and depiction, the relative contribution to meaning from these 
sources can range from depiction as a minimal source of meaning, as in an 
identification portrait, to total contribution to meaning by depiction, as in an 
abstract photographic representation. 
From even this brief discussion of differences between words and images, 
it seems clear that depiction contributes to meaning in ways that the physical 
realization of words does not. Except in poetry, the form of words are only 
the carriers of meaning while depiction is more than a carrier of meaning, yet 
less than an independent source of meaning in most cases. 
We understand the meaning of words by understanding the rules, the 
conventional connection between signifier and signified-that is, through a 
deductive process. Our understanding of images derives from an inductive 
process based on the available evidence. 
There is more to this story: Units like words and shots are typically 
combined to form larger units. In language there are numerous characteristics 
of syntax, all of which are rule-governed. Take one of the more obvious of 
these rules, fixed word order. Certain classes of words occupy specifiable 
positions when signaling certain types of meaning. For instance, in English, 
the declarative sentence John is going contrasts with the interrogative Is John 
going only by word position. More importantly, of the four other logical 
arrangements of these words only Going is John has any grammatical status 
and then only in specialized usage. The other arrangements are immediately 
recognized by skilled speakers of English as being ungrammatical and of 
questionable meaning. Different languages have different rules for word order, 
but in any language there are rules for acceptable word order. 
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Another example of the same sort may help. There are structure words 
that can be defined only with difficulty, and then not very satisfactorily. The 
function of these words is to relate meanings of other words in the context of 
a sentence. Although there may be disagreement in detail, structure words are 
generally believed to be meaningless in isolation. What is the meaning of 
words like: is, the, a, of, that, which? These words are boundary markers. 
There are other characteristics of language such as indicating categories 
which make it possible or mandatory in different languages to express states 
of time, place, and certainty about utterances; these indicating categories 
include things like personal pronouns, tense, mood, and number. 
These and other language characteristics function as signaling devices for 
specifying semantic relationships apart from the meaning of individual words. 
These characteristics are part of the logical structure of language. They are 
the specifying markers for the logical framework in the formal sense that 
syntax is a logical framework from which deductions are made. One 
comprehends a verbal utterance in terms of understanding the rules from 
which the utterance is constructed. 
Knowledge of the rules enables us to make deductions even from 
nonsense sentences that are grammatically constructed. Consider 
Jabberwocky: "Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the 
wabe." There are no such English words as brillig, slithy, toves, gyre, gimble, 
wabe, yet the sentence makes a kind of sense for two reasons, the form of the 
nonsense words, and the form of the sentence. 
The form of the nonsense words follow the rules of English phonology. 
There are no phonemic combinations that are unacceptable in English, such 
as /dzi/ which represents a combination of sounds that are uttered easily by 
any Polish four year old. The nonsense words of Jabberwocky could be 
acceptable English words if they signified anything; it just happens that they 
do not. 
The form of the sentence, as supported by the structure words, also 
follows the rules of English grammar: "Twas ' and the 
did and in the . The word 'twas is a contraction of the 
phrase it was; knowledge of the rules of English tells us that this phrase could 
be followed grammatically only by words referring to time or condition, for 
instance, it was raining or it was Sunday but not it was house. Further 
deductions based on knowledge of the rules tells a skilled speaker of English 
that the next two blank terms refer to the subject of the sentence; the structure 
word did would be followed by actions performed by the subjects, while the 
structure words in the would be followed by a location for these actions. 
In short, language is a deductive system. And the rules of this deductive 
system depend on the existence of boundaries. To use the system one must 
know which rules are applicable to different parts of the boundary. 
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In film there are no similar characteristics; there are no boundaries in 
film coding variables. There is no point at which a change in a coding variable 
is or is not "phonemic." There is no known limit on the placement within a 
sequence of any particular class of shot. There is no conventional way to 
signal the nature of the relationship between shots; there is no depictional 
equivalent to is, the, a, of, that, which, and so on. Nor, to sharpen the point, 
is there the equivalent of and so on. 
The general absence of conventional sequencing rules and conventional 
devices to signal relationships between images has important consequences for 
film. The relationship between succeeding images is direct and imperative, 
based on the immediacy of the juxtaposition between images. When two 
pieces of film are stuck together (to use the English translation of Eisenstein's 
phrase) they are separated only by a substantially invisible marker, the splice. 
There is direct and immediate contact between objects across a cut in a 
sequence. All arrangements have potential meaning; succeeding images qualify 
each other. Each juxtaposition can evoke meaning not obviously present in 
either element in the pair. 
However, it is not reasonable to assert that all combinations evoke 
meaning equally. The meaning evoked by sequencing and juxtaposition is 
contingent on the shots being edited. Understanding any sequence is based on 
an inductive process that integrates the separate meanings; there are no 
specific deductive rules to guide the interpretation of film. Saying this is not 
saying much, unless more can be said to explain the operation of the inductive 
process in film. A start can be made by observing that the characteristics of 
language I have discussed such as phonemic boundaries, fixed word order, 
structure words, and other I have merely mentioned are logic markers for a 
deductive system that is empty of content. By contrast, content does matter 
in an inductive system. 
What then are the logic markers for film? Individually the markers are 
simple; taken as a group there are powerful implications. The techniques that 
constitute what I am calling logic markers in film are part of the pragmatics 
of film production and are well-understood by all practitioners, even those who 
are only semi-skilled. One begins to become fluent in film coding when one 
begins to appreciate the possibilities of matching and contrasting things such 
as actions, composition, lighting. Or indeed not editing but rather showing a 
single event in a single long take, to maintain the integrity of the dramatic 
space.6 
Among objects and events in a particular shot there are numerous codes 
operating, such as behavior, dialogue, costumes, settings, and so on. Various 
aspects of these codes can be connected to each other through depiction. 
Within particular shots, coding variables are the logic markers; they can 
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emphasize elements of some object or event code, obscuring others, or 
connecting still others within the composition. 
The whole rangé of coding variables are available to be used as logic 
markers to guide interpretation of particular scenes. Other logic markers 
operate between shots; such editing techniques as matched and contrasted 
composition, matched and contrasted lighting, matched action and jump cuts, 
and so on, function to relate or contrast events. Specific techniques of 
composition and editing as logic markers serve to influence interpretation of 
filmic images as does grammar in language. 
The marking of logic does not depend solely on the technical 
considerations of depiction, but also on the events being depicted. Meanings 
of sequences are compounded by establishing relationships among attributes 
of events, through appropriate depiction. Conversely, the status of a particular 
depictional element depends on the events being depicted. In other words, 
events and depiction are interacting in both composition and editing. 
This interaction between events and depiction underlie the weakness of 
the "film grammar" approach to film analysis. There is nothing fixed and 
immutable about, say, the meaning of a low angle. Any meaning it does have 
is conventional. The significance of a particular depiction element depends on 
the significance of the object or event being depicted. 
Some of the multiple codes of film subsumed as events may be deductive 
but depiction interacts with codes modifying and altering them. Even the 
boundaries of language can be modified when language is juxtaposed with 
images; shifts of a sound track a few frames one way or another can alter the 
significance of a verbal utterance. Through interaction, codes-even deductive 
ones—become elements in the inductive system. 
The significance of logic markers in film varies from case to case since 
there are no fixed boundaries of depiction and the markers depend on the 
events being depicted. The whole system is inductive, depending not on rules, 
but on the context-the specific facts of the case. In each separate work and 
within a single work there are shifting relationships between events and 
depiction and shifting boundaries in depiction. 
Any theory of film must take into account the lack of boundaries within 
a system; an analytic requirement for boundaries would distort the analysis of 
the phenomenon. I suspect that this kind of distortion is reflected in the 
historically close relationship between theoretical description and aesthetic 
imperative. It seems to me that many theorists who knew better overlooked 
the lack of boundaries in film when they tried to support their aesthetic 
position by deductive rules that required boundaries. 
At different times, Pudovkin, Eisenstein, and Bazin made contradictory 
claims about the role of editing. Pudovkin wrote about constructive editing, 
that is, "the resolving of the material into its elements and subsequent building 
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from them of a filmic whole." Bazin rejected this idea when he stated as a 
"law of aesthetics" that "when the essence of a scene demands the simultaneous 
presence of two or more factors in the action, montage is ruled out." By 
contrast, Eisenstein argued that a new meaning can arise from a collision of 
two images. 
Each theorist was correct for a particular body of work, but their "rules" 
were incorrect in general precisely because they were deductive descriptions 
of an inductive phenomenon. Their rules were easily contradicted by evidence 
acceptable to anyone not committed to a particular aesthetic. In other words, 
one can be moved, excited, and enthralled by The Maltese Falcon, The 
Battleship Potemkin and Citizen Kane although each was constructed according 
to different "rules." 
Another yield from the analysis of film as an inductive system is a 
theoretical explanation of the flexibility of the system. The rules of language, 
with some exceptions, are operating rules; they tell us how to make the system 
work. The rules of film, with some exceptions are process rules which describe 
the possibilities and within which there are no impossible sequences. The 
difference between the two types of rules may be illustrated by the rules 
surrounding the automobile. 
The rules for actually driving a car are operating rules; they tell us how 
to make the car work—start the engine by doing thus and so, engage the 
transmission this way, and so on. In contrast, the rules of the road are process 
rules. The rule for speed limits, for instance, can say that one 
should not go faster than a certain number of miles per hour; anyone who has 
been on the highway recently knows what this means. There are always people 
exceeding the speed limit. 
The exceptions to the proposition that language is governed by operating 
rules and film is controlled by process rules are worth looking at. There are 
some process elements in language, but they are relatively trivial overlays. 
Occasional terms appear and disappear in a language through process rules; 
however, while they are part of the language they are governed by operating 
rules. During the 1920s and 1930s in the United States slang terms such as 
cat's whiskers and groovy entered the language as terms of praise. While they 
were current, however, they were used as adjectives and were governed by all 
of the appropriate rules for adjectives. 
There do not seem to be any elements of film similar to operating rules 
of language, but there are some non-process elements which stem from the 
physiology of perception. Contrary to the commonly held view, perception of 
a picture (or anything else, for that matter) is not instantaneous. The 
complete image is crudely perceived as a whole but detailed perception is 
constructed through a process of scanning in a series of small rapid jerks of 
the eye (technically, saccades). 
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Professionals in film have a practical understanding of saccades. 
According to the winner of an Academy Award for editing, "one learns quickly 
in this business that the eye is attracted to light and movement." A linguistic 
model will not aid scholars develop a theoretical understanding of the 
constraints imposed by the physiological facts. We can ignore them, of 
course. To do so would risk a warped account of the comprehension of film. 
The conventions of film are weak conventions; in a highly flexible system 
like film, conventions can be only approximate. At best they are 
quasi-conventions. Even the most conventional parts of the system are 
flexible. To the degree that filmmakers make films for an audience, they use 
a crude estimate of what the audience might be able to understand. 
There are two sources of looseness in this process mitigating rigid 
conventions: the filmmaker's skill and intention, and the looseness of the 
filmmaker's estimate of the audience. Investigations of these quasi-conventions 
can be valuable so long as their status is explicitly clear. In such analyses, one 
is dealing with probabilities, not certainties. In short, one is dealing with an 
inductive system. 
The broadest implication of the distinction between deductive logic and 
inductive logic applied to the analysis of film is that it calls into question the 
code-oriented structural approaches advocated in the early writings of Metz 
and others, and still present in some contemporary analyses. There is no 
distinction between filmic and cinematic. In this view everything is 
"cinematic." 
If I am right that an inductive approach emphasizes the functional 
interaction of all code elements, it may begin to be possible to address 
seriously the relationship between dramatic presentation and cinematic 
depiction. The battle over the uniqueness of film as distinct from drama 
ceased a long time ago to be interesting. I suspect that drama is also an 
inductive system. Yet for reasons that are probably not relevant at this 
moment, our colleagues in Theater have a richer body of theory that is 
applicable to production than we do. We have practically no production theory 
except the prescriptive dogma of the early theorists. Can we continue to 
simply stipulate that film has nothing to do with theater? I doubt it. Instead 
I suspect that we could learn a great deal about both if we examined their 
similarities as inductive systems. 
Temple University 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
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